Late March 43 BCE: To the Magistrates and People of Rome from Lucius Munatius Plancus (in Transalpine Gaul)
Plancus proclaims his loyalty to the Senate in an official letter
Plancus, imperator, consul designate, greets the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the Plebs, Senate, People, and Plebs of Rome.1
If perhaps I seem to have kept people’s expectation and the Republic’s hope regarding my intentions in suspense for too long, I think I must excuse myself before I promise anything to anyone about my future service to the State. For I do not want to seem like I am making up for a previous fault; instead, I am disclosing what I have been thinking with a loyal heart for a long time now.
It has not passed me by that when people are so anxious and the State is so very confused, professing one’s good intentions is extremely profitable. I have become accustomed to seeing a good number of men gain great honours through this. But fortune has put me in a difficult situation, where I must either promise great results quickly and thus create obstacles to actually bringing about those results, or by holding myself back from doing this, have better opportunities to assist.
I preferred to clear the way towards our shared salvation rather than just my own glory. For who is there, with the good fortune I currently possess,2 and after the life which I think people know I have lived, and the prospects I have in my grasp, who could bear anything disgraceful, or desire anything malicious?
But I needed a certain amount of time and intense effort and great expense in order to fulfil any promises to the Republic and all loyal men, and to come to the aid of the Republic not with empty hands and good intentions, but with the means to help instead.
I had to confirm that my soldiers were loyal (as they had often been led astray by large rewards) and get them to hope for moderate rewards from the Republic, rather than unlimited rewards from a single man. I had to confirm that several states were loyal,3 which last year were laid under obligation by bribes and granted rewards, and make them realise that those promises were empty and that they should seek the same things from better sources. I also had to sound out the intentions of the men in charge of nearby provinces and armies, and convince them to unite as a group in the defence of freedom, rather than to share between just a few a victory fatal to the whole world.4
In fact, I had to defend my own person by increasing the size of my army and multiplying the number of my auxiliaries, so that—although I prefer not to keep my sentiments secret—I would not be in any danger when it became known which side I would support, despite certain people’s objections.
And so I shall never deny that, in order to accomplish my current plans, I have unwillingly pretended many things, and painfully disguised many others—for I have seen from the difficult situation my colleague5 is in how dangerous a premature declaration by a loyal but unprepared citizen can be.
On this account, I even gave my legate Gaius Furnius, a brave and active man, more in depth commands verbally than are in my written dispatch, so that they could read you more covertly and I could be more safe. In these, I gave instructions as to what action must be taken, both to defend our common safety, and for myself to be armed.
From this it can be understood that I have been concerned for a long time now over caring for the defence of the most important interests of the Republic. Now, by the kindness of the gods, I am more prepared in every way, and wish for people to not only have high hopes for me, but to believe in me with certainty.
I have five legions in fighting order, closely attached to the Republic by their loyalty and courage, and following me due to my generosity towards them. I have my province as prepared as it can be, with the agreement of every state within it, and there is great competition as they vie with one another to render their services. I have cavalry and as many auxiliary forces as the peoples here can raise to defend their own safety and freedom.
For my own part, I am fully prepared either to defend my province, or to go wherever the Republic calls me, or to hand over my army, auxiliaries, and province—or, I would not refuse to direct the full force of the war against myself, if only I could guarantee my country’s safety or delay the danger to it through my own downfall.
If I promise these things at a time when the whole situation has already been resolved and the State is at peace, I shall rejoice that the Republic has benefitted, despite the damage to my reputation. But if I approach my share of great and unmitigated dangers, then I trust that impartial judges will defend my plans from envious detractors.
For my own part, the safety of the Republic is in itself the greatest reward for my services. But I feel like I must ask that you consider those men6 as commended to you, who have obeyed my authority and—much more importantly—remained loyal to you, and have not been able to be deceived by any false hope, or frightened by any terror.
Latin text of Ad Familiares 10.8 | Glossary | Historia Civilis video overview of 44-43 BCE
This letter arrived in Rome (with Cic. Fam. 10.7) on April 7th.
i.e. the various offices Caesar appointed him to, including that of consul designate for 42 BCE.
i.e. Gallic states in Transalpine Gaul. Footnote borrowed from E. S. Shuckburgh: ‘Plancus had been preceded in the governorship of Gallia Comata [Transalpine Gaul] by Hirtius, who, however, had not gone there in person, but had governed by a legatus. Immediately after the death of Caesar, Antony had apparently taken means to secure the fidelity of the Gauls to himself.’
Footnote borrowed from Shackleton Bailey: ‘This passage is generally misinterpreted. paucoribus [with just a few] are not the Antonians; Plancus does not suggest that he could ever have joined them. His point is that he preferred to organize for the constitutionalists, whose victory is assumed in any case, an overwhelming superiority of force. That meant sharing honour and rewards with a larger number of his peers (cf. 382 (X.II).3 fin.), but it also meant that victory would be won at a smaller cost in human life and suffering.
Decimus Brutus, who was still besieged in Mutina.
i.e. Plancus’ soldiers.